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Abstract
This article analyses the impact of the EU's new Constitutional Treaty on the parliaments of its 
member states, with specific focus on access to information and on monitoring compliance with the 
subsidiarity principle. The main argument of the article is that while the Constitutional Treaty will 
strengthen the position of the national legislatures in the EU policy process, this empowerment 
does not constitute a major departure from the present situation. National parliaments will have 
better access to EU documents, and these information rights improve the capacity of national 
parliaments to control their governments. National parliaments will also gain a collective role in 
overseeing the implementation of the subsidiarity principle, but the effects of this mechanism will 
probably remain modest. While national MPs have thus stronger constitutional rights to control 
their governments, the increased use of the open method of coordination and other forms of 
intergovernmental policy coordination at least partially undermine these positive developments. 
The article concludes by proposing a set of reforms that would enable national legislatures to make 
a stronger impact on EU politics. 
Kurzfassung
Dieser Artikel analysiert den Einfluss des neuen EU-Verfassungsvertrages auf die Parlamente der 
Mitgliedstaaten, mit spezifischem Fokus auf den Zugang zu Information und die Überwachung der 
Einhaltung des Subsidiaritätsprinzips. Hauptargument des Artikels ist, dass, während der 
Verfassungsvertrag die Position der nationalen Gesetzgebungen im EU-politischen Prozess zwar 
stärken würde, diese Übertragung von Verantwortung kein grundlegendes Abweichen von der 
gegenwärtigen Situation bedeutet. Nationale Parlamente würden besseren Zugang zu EU-
Dokumenten erhalten, und diese Informationsrechte verbesserten die Kapazität der nationalen 
Parlamente, ihre Regierungen zu kontrollieren. Nationale Parlamente würden auch eine kollektive 
Rolle in der Überwachung der Umsetzung des Subsidiaritätsprinzips erlangen, aber die Effekte 
dieses Mechanismus würden wahrscheinlich bescheiden bleiben. Während nationale 
Parlamentsabgeordnete also stärkere verfassungsrechtliche Rechte zur Kontrolle ihrer Regierungen 
hätten, würde die gesteigerte Anwendung der Methode der offenen Koordinierung und anderer 
Formen der intergouvernementalen Politikkoordination diese positiven Entwicklungen zumindest 
teilweise untergraben. Der Artikel schlägt abschließend eine Reihe von Reformen vor, welche es 
nationalen Gesetzgebungen ermöglichen würden, einen stärkeren Einfluss auf die EU-Politik 
auszuüben. 
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Introduction  
Parliaments are central institutions in European systems of government. They elect and control the 
government, approve legislation, and as the bodies responsible for amending the constitution hold 
the ultimate power in society. Yet such constitutional perspective is arguably increasingly divorced 
from reality. National parliaments (hereafter NPs) are usually portrayed in the academic literature as 
reactive institutions, casting rather modest influence on policy initiatives coming from the executive. 
The technicality of most legislation, strong party government, and the growing relevance of external 
constraints – globalisation, judicialization through the activism of national and European courts, and 
delegation of policy-making authority to various public or private agencies, not least central banks – 
all limit the real influence of parliaments, no matter how extensive their formal powers may be 
(Norton ed. 1998; Strøm et al. eds. 2003; Raunio and Hix 2000).(1)  
There is likewise broad consensus about the impact of European integration on NPs. Most of the 
literature on the role of NPs in the political system of the European Union (EU) sees them as victims 
of European integration (e.g., Norton ed. 1996; Raunio and Hix 2000; Maurer and Wessels eds. 
2001). Constitutionally, the issue is relatively straightforward. Powers which previously were under 
the jurisdiction of national legislatures have been shifted upwards to the European level (by national 
legislatures themselves – thereby signalling that the benefits accruing to member states from 
integration outweigh the losses to national parliamentary sovereignty). Amendments to the Treaties, 
the EU’s “constitution”, are subject to unanimous agreement between the member states. But, after 
the negotiations in Intergovernmental Conferences (IGC) have been completed, the only options for 
domestic legislatures are to accept the constitutional bargains without amendment or to reject the 
packages and plunge the EU into constitutional crisis. In the Council the increased use of qualified 
majority voting (QMV) makes it difficult for NPs to force governments to make ex ante 
commitments before taking decisions at the European level. Moreover, the extensive involvement of 
national ministers and civil servants in drafting and implementing EU legislation insulates or 
marginalises NPs, regardless of the Council decision rule.
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The resulting information deficit reduces the ability of domestic MPs to control their governments in 
European matters. In fact, through the centrality of technical expertise in the EU policy process, the 
true winners of European integration have arguably been bureaucrats and organised private interests 
at all levels of government and not directly-elected representatives – the traditional holders of 
legitimacy in European systems of parliamentary government (e.g., Bergman and Damgaard eds. 
2000; Kassim et al. eds. 2000; Wessels et al. eds. 2003). Not surprisingly, the overwhelming 
majority of both national MPs and Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) think that national 
parliamentary control of EU legislation is weak and needs to be strengthened (Katz 1999).  
While such pessimistic conclusions might actually underestimate the influence of NPs, the 
challenges facing them deserve to be taken seriously. Active scrutiny by individual NPs of their 
governments is important in ensuring democratic input into the EU policy process, as the principal 
actors in the EU are still national governments that take decisions in the European Council and the 
Council. The main problem facing legislatures is how to reduce informational asymmetry in order to 
facilitate effective parliamentary accountability. This is where the constitutional rules adopted at the 
European level are potentially of great significance, particularly so for those member states where 
the legislative branch has traditionally been weak in relation to the executive even independent of 
European integration.  
This article analyses the implications of the Constitutional Treaty for the national parliaments, with 
specific focus on access to information and on monitoring compliance with the subsidiarity principle. 
The main argument is that while the Constitutional Treaty will strengthen the position of the national 
legislatures in the EU policy process, this empowerment does not constitute a major departure from 
the present situation. National parliaments will have better access to EU documents, and these 
information rights improve the capacity of national parliaments to control their governments. 
National parliaments will also gain a collective role in overseeing the implementation of the 
subsidiarity principle, but the effects of this mechanism will probably remain modest. While national 
MPs have thus stronger constitutional rights to control their governments, the increased use of soft 
law instruments, such as the open method of coordination, at least partially undermines these 
positive developments. The article concludes by proposing a set of reforms that would enable 
national legislatures to make a stronger impact on EU politics.  
1. National Parliaments In The Convention  
The role of national legislatures featured prominently in the debates in the Convention, but had little 
prominence during the IGC that followed – largely because issues concerning national parliaments 
had already been resolved during the Convention.(2) This focus on national parliaments in the 
Convention had two different motivations: “The burgeoning interest in a larger European role for 
national parliaments (by no means confined only to Spain or the United Kingdom) sometimes 
reflected the fear of certain national parliamentarians that the evolution of the European Union’s 
legislative structures was condemning them to an ever more marginal role. In other quarters, by 
contrast, the hope was occasionally expressed that national parliamentarians would be more 
enthusiastic advocates of continuing European integration if they had a greater direct stake in the 
process.” (Donnelly and Hoffmann 2004: 1)  
Indeed, while previous speeches and reform proposals about strengthening the role of NPs could 
often be disregarded as cheap talk aimed at domestic audiences, the increased political significance 
of the Union and the Laeken Declaration had taken the debate to a completely another level. 
Declaration no. 23 of the Treaty of Nice listed four key questions which the next IGC should 
address, and one of them was “the role of national parliaments in the European architecture”.(3)
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And the Laeken Declaration from December 2001 set more precise questions about national 
parliaments: “Should they be represented in a new institution, alongside the Council and the 
European Parliament? Should they have a role in areas of European action in which the European 
Parliament has no competence? Should they focus on the division of competence between Union and 
Member States, for example through preliminary checking of compliance with the principle of 
subsidiarity?”(4)  
The Convention established a separate Working Group (WG IV), entitled “The role of national 
parliaments”, for meeting the demands of the ‘Laeken mandate’.(5) The role of national parliaments 
in monitoring the subsidiarity principle was primarily discussed in WG I on “The principle of 
subsidiarity”. The proceedings of WG IV illustrated well both the almost unanimous desire to 
improve national scrutiny of governments in EU matters, and the lack of enthusiasm for the 
establishment of a collective organ of national MPs or for changing the functions of the Conference 
of the European Affairs Committees (COSAC)(6). The WG agreed that enhancing the input of 
national parliaments would make the EU more democratic and legitimate, but it also recognised that 
“the primary role of national parliaments in European matters was carried out through effective 
scrutiny of their government's action at the European level. It was also acknowledged that the 
different systems for national parliamentary scrutiny reflected different arrangements for the 
relations between governments and national parliaments in conformity with constitutional 
requirements in individual Member States, and that it would not be appropriate to prescribe at 
European level how the scrutiny should be organised” (European Convention 2002a: 4). On 
COSAC, the WG came out in favour of status quo: “The mandate of COSAC should be clarified to 
strengthen its role as an interparliamentary mechanism. It could usefully act as a platform for a 
regular exchange of information and best practices, not only between European Affairs Committees, 
but also between sectoral standing committees. It should become a stronger network for exchange 
between parliaments.” (European Convention 2002a: 15)  
The vast majority of the recommendations of the WG on NPs were almost without any controversy 
endorsed(7) first by the Convention and then by the IGC. Hence they found their way into the 
Constitutional Treaty. However, one controversial idea related to NPs was rejected by the 
Convention – Giscard d’Estaing’s proposal for a Congress of the Peoples of Europe that was initially 
included in the first draft for the constitution published in October 2002 (European Convention 
2002b). In April 2003 the Praesidium of the Convention proposed a new draft Article to be inserted 
in Title VI of Part One of the Constitutional Treaty (“The Union’s Democratic Life”), providing for 
the establishment of a Congress which would have met once every year, bringing together 
representatives of the EP and NPs. According to the initiative the Congress would have comprised 
no more than 700 members, with 2/3 of them from NPs. Its functions were to be purely consultative: 
the Congress would hear a ‘State of the Union‘ speech by the President of the European Council and 
be presented with the Commission’s annual legislative programme (Rizzuto 2003: 11). Giscard 
d’Estaing’s idea met strong resistance, and hence it was dropped from the draft constitution.  
The following two sections of the article will examine the two main changes in the Constitutional 
Treaty concerning NPs, improved access to information, and monitoring the subsidiarity principle.  
2. The Good News: Improved Access To Information  
The main sections of the Constitutional Treaty dealing with NPs are in two Protocols annexed to the 
Treaty: the ‘Protocol on the Role of National Parliaments in the European Union’ and the ‘Protocol 
on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality’. The former Protocol is 
designed to make national MPs better informed about the European decision-making process, while 
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Information is a fundamental prerequisite for both controlling the government and influencing policy 
proposals coming from the executive. Overall, the ability of parliaments to control executives has 
arguably declined in recent decades, and this is in no small part caused by the huge informational 
advantage enjoyed by the executive branch. The process of European integration is certainly one of 
the reasons why this has happened – providing executives an arena for action away from domestic 
parliamentary scrutiny, and a near-monopoly of information in an ever-larger range of public 
policies. However, NPs have in response to these developments introduced changes – both to 
national constitutions and to their own rules of procedure – that force governments to explain their 
EU policies and actions in the European arena to parliaments (Maurer and Wessels eds. 2001). The 
driving force behind this partial retrenchment is the desire by parliamentarians to redress the 
‘information gap’ between governing elites and the parliamentary rank-and-file (Raunio and Hix 
2000).  
Nevertheless, in European matters parliaments have in most member states so far been largely 
dependent on information provided by the government. The problem has been worsened by the fact 
that most European legislatures have quite limited secretarial and research staff(8), and therefore 
parliaments have not been able to produce complementary or alternative information in addition to 
that provided by the government. The biggest challenge facing national legislatures is thus how to 
reduce the informational asymmetry that is currently strongly in favour of the executive. In order to 
succeed in this formidable task, national parliamentarians need information about the preferences 
and negotiation strategies of (a) their governments, (b) the EU institutions (Commission, EP), and (c) 
the other member states.(9)  
The Constitutional Treaty goes a long way towards remedying the existing information deficit. When 
comparing the new text with that included in the Protocol attached to the Amsterdam Treaty, the 
differences are quite significant indeed. According to the new Protocol, “Draft European legislative 
acts sent to the European Parliament and to the Council shall be forwarded to national Parliaments. 
For the purposes of this Protocol, ‘draft European legislative acts’ shall mean proposals from the 
Commission, initiatives from a group of Member States, initiatives from the European Parliament, 
requests from the Court of Justice, recommendations from the European Central Bank and requests 
from the European Investment Bank for the adoption of a European legislative act.” The difference 
between the new text and the Amsterdam Treaty is very clear, as the latter stated that national 
legislatures had the right to receive only “legislation as defined by the Council in accordance with 
Article 151. 3 of the Treaty establishing the European Community.” Secondly, these legislative 
documents shall be sent directly to national parliaments by the respective institutions, whereas under 
the present rules the “Government of each Member State may ensure that its own national parliament 
receives them as appropriate.”  
NPs also gained improved access to non-legislative documents. According to the new Protocol, 
“Commission consultation documents (green and white papers and communications) shall be 
forwarded directly by the Commission to national Parliaments upon publication. ” Here the wording 
is almost the same as in Amsterdam Treaty, which stipulated that these documents were to be 
“promptly forwarded” to national parliaments. But, there are new documents that the national 
parliaments are entitled to receive. These are the Commission’s annual legislative programme “as 
well as any other instrument of legislative planning or policy”. Moreover, NPs will also get the 
annual reports of the Court of Auditors.9a 
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Not only do NPs gain much better access to documents, they will also in the future have better 
opportunities to follow what actually goes on in the Council. Hitherto the Council has met behind 
closed doors, but according to Article I-24(6) it shall meet in public when examining and adopting a 
legislative proposal.(10) In addition, the Protocol on national parliaments states that the “The 
agendas for and the outcome of meetings of the Council, including the minutes of meetings where 
the Council is deliberating on draft European legislative acts, shall be forwarded directly to national 
Parliaments, at the same time as to Member States' governments. ”(11) As a result of these changes, 
NPs – and indeed, the media and citizens-- have finally the chance to hear and see what the ministers 
actually say and how they vote in the Council.  
However, the significance of these changes should not be overestimated. The Council has since 1994 
published its voting records and since 1999 the records are available at the Council’s website. But, 
while the final decisions are taken by the ministers in the Council, it has been estimated that even up 
to 90 % of all legislative issues are already decided by civil servants in Coreper and in the Council’s 
working groups. As a result, actual voting in the Council is still relatively rare (Mattila 2004). This 
probably lessens the informational value (for example, through reducing the number of speeches 
made and the time spent on debating matters) of the Council’s meetings. Moreover, the increased 
openness and access to the minutes of the Council’s meetings concerns only those sessions when the 
Council acts in legislative capacity. This means that those meetings dealing with other than 
legislative issues, such as coordination of national economic and employment policies, or indeed 
policy-making in general, fall outside of this category.(12)  
3. Addressing The Legitimacy Deficit: Monitoring Subsidiarity  
Of the various Articles that mention NPs, by far the most talked about has been the ‘early warning 
system’ established for monitoring the principle of subsidiarity. In fact, while both the role of NPs 
and the proper application of the subsidiarity principle had been on the EU’s agenda for at least a 
decade, the Convention was really the first time that a connection between the two was firmly 
established (Rittberger 2004: 26).(13) However, the argument put forward in this section is that 
national legislatures are unlikely to make much use of this mechanism and that it can even 
potentially cause more damage than good, both nationally and at the European level.  
The rules of the early warning system are spelled out in the Protocol on the Application of the 
Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality. The procedure includes five steps (adapted from 
Donnelly and Hoffmann 2004: 2; Maurer and Kietz 2004: 3-4):  
1. First the Commission must examine its legislative proposals for their conformity with the 
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. Before proposing new legislation, the 
Commission must satisfy itself that the matter could not be better regulated at national rather 
than European level (‘subsidiarity’) and that the measures proposed stand in a reasonable 
relationship to the goals to be achieved (‘proportionality’).(14)  
2. Then the Commission must forward its legislative proposals to the national parliaments at the 
same time as it forwards them to the Council and the EP. Within six weeks of receiving the 
proposal, NPs may issue their opinion on whether the initiative complies with the subsidiarity 
principle (but not with the related principle of proportionality). This first phase constitutes a 
preliminary reading involving only the national legislatures. After the six weeks have elapsed, 
the Commission then submits the (possibly) revised proposal for ordinary processing 
according to the relevant legislative procedure. Any subsequent resolutions of the EP or 
positions adopted by the Council on legislative proposals must equally be sent immediately to 
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3. If a chamber of a NP believes that a proposal is in breach of the principle of subsidiarity, it 
may then send to the Presidents of the EP, Council and Commission a ‘reasoned opinion’ (‘the 
yellow card’) on the proposed legislation, setting out the reasons for its concerns.  
4. If these ‘reasoned opinions’ represent at least 1/3 of the votes (at least ¼ in the case of 
Commission proposals or initiatives emanating from a group of member states under the 
provisions of judicial cooperation in criminal matters and police cooperation) allocated to NPs 
and their chambers (unicameral parliaments have two votes; each chamber of a bicameral 
system has one vote), the Commission must review its draft legislation. The Commission may 
then decide whether to maintain, amend or withdraw its proposal.(16) This means that the 
Commission (which can be voted out of office by the EP, not the national parliaments) 
remains the agenda-setter in the process, and that it can ignore the NPs’ concerns and press 
forward with its proposal without making any amendments.(17)  
5. Where a NP believes that the legislative initiative infringes the principle of subsidiarity, it may 
ask its national government to bring a case before the European Court of Justice (ECJ). This 
step, however, can only be taken retrospectively when the legislation has been adopted. This 
final stage does not mean any substantive changes to the existing arrangements. Already now 
any member state, perhaps at the request of its parliament, can bring actions before the Court if 
it thinks that the EU has no right to legislate on the subject matter.(18)  
The ’early warning system’ is not entirely without positive consequences. It can make the NPs feel 
that they genuinely have a say in the EU policy process, and this can produce a potentially very 
significant ‘spill-over’ effect, making them invest more resources in scrutinising EU matters. It can 
also force the Commission to be more detailed and explicit in its arguments for why new EU level 
legislation is called for.(19) However, the negative aspects of the mechanism are also worth closer 
examination.  
Perhaps the biggest problem with the system is that through making NPs direct participants in the 
EU’s legislative process, it goes against the very principle of parliamentary democracy. After all, the 
defining criterion of parliamentary democracy is that the government is accountable to the legislature 
and can be voted out of office by it. The parliament (the principal) delegates policy-making powers 
to the executive (its agent), which then rules with the support of the legislature. But now the 
subsidiarity control mechanism can reverse these roles.(20) If a NP rejects an initiative on the 
grounds of it breaking the subsidiarity principle, it will then effectively adopt a different stand from 
the body (the government) which it supposedly controls.(21) (Langdal 2003) This could be 
potentially damaging for the government that has been consulted in drafting the initiative (and has 
probably already discussed this initiative in the Council).  
The second problem is that concerns over subsidiarity can be very difficult to separate from concerns 
about the policy contents of the initiative. The mechanism can be used by a parliament that simply 
does not agree with a certain initiative, disguising its concerns as a violation of the subsidiarity 
principle (Langdal 2003: 37; Vergés Bausili 2002: 16). Thirdly, the process is an entirely voluntary 
one, and it is very likely that NPs will use it with varying degrees of interest. If parliaments have few 
resources available (as is the case, for example, in most of the new member states(22)), then 
investing scarce resources in checking subsidiarity is probably not on top of the list for MPs. 
(Donnelly and Hoffmann 2004: 3) Indeed, as is the case with overall scrutiny of the government in 
EU matters, it is probable that only a minority of NPs will take this scrutiny process seriously, 
subjecting most legislative initiatives to careful examination. 
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This mechanism will therefore put demands on exchange of information between NPs (for example, 
through COSAC)(23), as each parliament will need information if the other legislatures are planning 
to submit opinions stating that the initiative is in breach with the principle of subsidiarity. And 
finally, even if NPs could muster the required amount of votes for showing the ‘yellow card’, the 
Commission still holds the ultimate power in the process and can ignore the NPs’ opinions. Giving 
NPs the power of veto (‘the red card’) would thus have provided national MPs with a considerably 
stronger incentive for taking the ‘early warning system’ seriously. However, it is understandable 
why the ‘red card’ alternative was not chosen as it could have provided national parliaments a 
(potentially) effective mechanism for blocking a significant amount of EU legislation.  
The ‘early warning system’ is unlikely to have much significance. It may encourage the Commission 
to pay more attention to justifying its proposals, and it may stimulate tighter control of governments 
by individual NPs, but it is very probable that the mechanism will be used only very seldom.(24) It is 
a relatively harmless procedure, primarily designed to inject legitimacy into the EU policy process: 
“It was a commonly held view among member state policy makers that national parliaments were 
key in strengthening the democratic legitimacy of the EU by bringing it ‘closer to the citizens’. It 
was thus seen as a logical and widely accepted argument that the political institutions that were seen 
to have suffered most from ever more transfers of sovereignty to the European level – national 
parliaments – should be entitled to have a say regarding the application of the principle of 
subsidiarity, putting – if deemed necessary – a brake on the appropriation of policy-making 
competencies by the Commission.” (Rittberger 2004: 27)  
Moreover, it must be emphasized that the proper implementation of the subsidiarity principle is only 
one part of the general problem of ‘creeping competence’, and hence even effective use of the ‘early 
warning system’ cannot alone put brakes on centralization. After all, subsidiarity applies only in the 
exercise of conferred powers that are either shared or complementary: the principle has no right to 
challenge the existing acquis communautaire, nor the Commission’s right of initiative.(25) Also the 
image of Commission, EP, and the ECJ as institutions constantly stretching and overstepping the 
limits of their powers is somewhat outdated. As Vergés Bausili (2002: 16) summarizes: “the early 
warning system can be more accurately pictured as a response to legitimacy issues than to strictly 
competence matters.”  
Having examined the two main changes in the Constitutional Treaty that concern national 
legislatures, the next section shall analyse the institutional implications of the various policy 
instruments dubbed as ‘soft law’. While the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) and other forms 
of (primarily intergovernmental) policy coordination are largely separate processes from the 
Constitutional Treaty, their growing relevance in the EU warrants an analysis of their consequences 
for NPs. It will be shown that so far NPs have remained marginalized in these processes, and that the 
increased use of OMC and other forms of policy coordination present a serious challenge to NPs.  
4. The Bad News: Soft Law And Policy Coordination  
When describing how the EU works, scholars have in recent years increasingly relied on the concept 
of ‘multi-level governance’. The basic tenets of this approach are that (i) decision-making 
competencies are shared by actors at different levels, sub-national, national and the European level; 
(ii) collective decision-making and pooling of sovereignty among member states involves a 
significant loss of control for individual national governments; and (iii) the political levels or arenas 
are interconnected, with policy choices on one level dependent on decisions taken at other levels 
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While intergovernmental policy coordination has been a feature of the EU’s decision-making system 
throughout the history of integration, such informal policy coordination has become much more 
prominent since the early 1990s. The European Employment Strategy (EES) adopted at the Essen 
European Council in 1994 and the coordination of national economic policies agreed in the 
Maastricht Treaty extended this coordination to two highly salient issue areas of domestic politics. 
And, the Open Method of Coordination became officially a part of EU jargon at the Lisbon 
European Council in 2000. OMC has four main components:  
1. fixed guidelines set for the EU, with short-, medium-, and long-term goals;  
2. quantitative and qualitative indicators and benchmarks;  
3. European guidelines translated into national and regional policies and targets; and  
4. periodic monitoring, evaluation and peer review, organized as a mutual learning process.  
In recent years OMC (together with other forms of policy coordination) has been applied to a broad 
range of policies, including employment, social policy, environment, taxation, immigration, 
research, transport, working time, social protection, education, social infrastructure, regional 
cohesion, and social inclusion.  
The increasing use of OMC and other forms of informal, non-binding, primarily intergovernmental 
‘soft law’ instruments needs to be understood in the context of the sensitive question of dividing 
competencies between the EU and its member states. European integration has reached the stage 
where the core areas of welfare state, such as social policy, employment, and education are starting 
to be affected. In these policy areas (that are both money-intensive and touch core areas of national 
sovereignty) it is very difficult to build the needed consensus among national governments for 
transferring policy-making authority to the European level – hence the resort to intergovernmental 
policy coordination. The national governments want, on the one hand, to achieve highly-valued 
policy objectives, such as reducing unemployment and making their economies more competitive, 
while on the other hand, they are not willing to cede formal sovereignty to the Union. The 
Commission meanwhile sees these new modes of governance as a way to expand EU’s competence 
in the face of resistance from the member states. (Héritier 2002; Borrás and Jacobsson 2004)  
The literature on OMC and other forms of soft law instruments – or ‘new modes of governance’ – is 
already quite extensive.(27) This literature has so far produced two main findings. First, it is still too 
early to make any definitive assessments of the success of OMC. Nevertheless, while the impact of 
OMC varies a lot between policy areas, scholars usually point that, unlike top-down supranational 
legislation, it is flexible and (supposedly) respects subsidiarity and national autonomy. The down-
side of this flexibility and non-binding nature of outputs is that the EU has few if any means to make 
the national governments follow its recommendations. (Héritier 2002; Scharpf 2002; Radaelli 2003; 
Régent 2003; Eberlein and Kerwer 2004; Borrás and Greve eds. 2004)  
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However, the more important findings in terms of NPs are those concerning the input of various 
‘stakeholders’ in the process. OMC has strengthened the leadership role of the Council and the 
European Council (where much of the policy coordination takes place), intruding thus on 
Commission’s right of monopoly, but on the other hand the Commission(28) has a central role to 
play through its role as the institution setting objectives and issuing guidelines and recommendations 
to national governments. The EP has until now been effectively marginalized, and, more worryingly, 
the contribution of local and regional actors, often identified as the main stakeholders in these 
processes, has so far been quite disappointing. At the national level OMC seems to be the preserve of 
a fairly small circle of civil servants that possess expertise on the issues. As OMC and all forms of 
soft law policy coordination are primarily intergovernmental in character(29), NPs are thus from a 
constitutional perspective in a strong position to influence the proceedings. However, this applies 
only if they are willing and able to control their governments in these matters (Hodson and Maher 
2001; de la Porte and Pochet 2003; Jacobsson and Vifell 2003; Radaelli 2003; Régent 2003; Borrás 
and Jacobsson 2004; Eberlein and Kerwer 2004).  
Significantly, the available evidence indicates that NPs have failed to make an impact in OMC and 
related processes. Examining policy coordination in employment policy, Kerstin Jacobsson and her 
colleagues show that National Action Plans (NAP) largely escaped parliamentary scrutiny or 
debates. To be sure, NPs have been informed about NAPs, but often after they have already been 
produced and sent off to Brussels. In some exceptional cases (Portugal, Ireland), national MPs did 
demand more information, and there were some examples of opposition parties using EU’s 
recommendations to support their own claims (Jacobsson and Schmid 2003; Jacobsson and Vifell 
2005). While there are no other studies detailing the contribution of NPs, it is noteworthy that 
domestic legislatures are hardly even mentioned in other publications on OMC. Therefore it is easy 
to concur with Radaelli (2003: 50) who argues: “Although there is some preliminary evidence of 
limited technocratic-political learning, the potential in terms of participation, openness, real 
transparency, increasing visibility in the domestic media and parliaments – in a word, the democratic 
aspects of the process – has not been fulfilled.”  
There are three main reasons why NPs have failed to make an impact under OMC. First, the whole 
process is by its very nature intergovernmental, with primarily civil servants responsible for drafting 
national programmes and presenting them in Brussels.(30) National MPs are informed of these 
preparations, but far too often this happens much too late. Secondly, national MPs may find it hard to 
follow OMC processes. Unlike normal EU legislation, OMC and other forms of policy coordination 
do not often have any fixed deadlines (“there is no clear beginning or end”) or even rules guiding the 
behaviour of the various actors. Given the intergovernmental or informal nature of OMC, there is 
also (at least in some NPs) procedural ambiguity about how to process these things in parliament and 
domestically in general (Jacobsson and Vifell 2005). For example, what are the rights of the national 
parliaments to receive the relevant information and documents, and how are these to be processed in 
the legislature. Hence it might be that NPs have simply not learned yet how to contribute to OMC 
issues, and that their contribution will become stronger over time. And thirdly, it appears that the 
actual impact of OMC and other forms of informal policy coordination has so far been relatively 
modest, if not even inconsequential, in many policy areas. As a result, national parliamentarians have 
not found it worthwhile to spend their precious time on scrutinizing such processes.  
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But, the challenge posed by intergovernmental policy coordination deserves to be taken very 
seriously. While the EU is not a fully-fledged federation, its multi-level political system resembles 
closely the cooperative federalism characteristic of many federal states. Indeed, OMC and other 
forms of policy coordination are classic examples of cooperative federalism, with common 
objectives defined by member states together with the Commission and/or the Council, monitoring 
by the EU institutions (federal level), and implementation and choice of instruments for meeting the 
objectives delegated to member states. Importantly, cooperative federalism is almost exclusively 
intergovernmental in character, and thus it is often called executive federalism.  
Regardless of how effective state parliaments are in controlling their governments, executive 
federalism concentrates power in the executive branch (Watts 1999: 57-59). For example, in 
Australia cooperative federalism has resulted in a proliferation of intergovernmental committees and 
working groups. The ministerial meetings are characterized by low openness and transparency and 
reliance on informal, but still politically binding, procedures and decisions. State parliaments have 
often voiced complaints about being sidelined in the negotiations. Moreover, in order to make 
decision-making possible in the first place, decisions are increasingly taken by (qualified) majority 
voting which further reduces the effective sovereignty of the states. (Painter 1998) Germany 
provides another good example. The role of the Länder in the implementation of federal laws has 
resulted in extensive intergovernmental cooperation, with a total of over one thousand working 
groups and committees. Again, the Land parliaments have seen their role weaken due to 
intergovernmental cooperation (Börzel 2000, 2002). Similarities with the EU are obvious, and 
without more active participation of NPs, the alleged deparliamentarisation caused by EU will be 
reinforced through the increased use of executive federalism in the Union.  
The final section of this article will summarize the main arguments and also makes a set of 
recommendations on how to improve the involvement of NPs in EU governance.  
Conclusion  
While most national parliaments have been rather late adapters to integration, there is no doubt that 
they do now exert tighter scrutiny on their governments than still a decade ago, and that this positive 
trend should not be reversed. The Constitutional Treaty does its share in facilitating a stronger role 
for national legislatures, but in the end it is up to national MPs themselves to decide to what extent 
they want to become involved in EU matters.  
Despite facing similar problems, and despite parliaments learning best practices from each other (as 
happened in the case of the enlargement in 2004 when the parliaments of the new member states 
studied the scrutiny systems in the ‘old’ EU countries), it is likely that parliaments will not produce a 
uniform response to the new constitutional provisions. After all, there are quite notable differences 
between the political systems and/or political cultures of EU member states. Some parliaments have 
throughout their recent history placed more emphasis on scrutinizing the government's legislative 
initiatives (for example, the Nordic parliaments), while in other countries the MPs understand their 
role quite differently (see Maurer and Wessels eds. 2001). Moreover, comparative research indicates 
that the level of scrutiny depends partly on non-institutional factors, such as public opinion on 
integration, the type and strength of the government (the share of parliamentary seats it controls, the 
unity of government parties, and the resulting changes in government/opposition dynamics) and the 
salience of issues on the EU's agenda (Holzhacker 2002; Raunio 2005). 
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The changes included in the Constitutional Treaty will give NPs much better access to information. 
National MPs shall receive more documents from the European level, and these documents will be 
sent directly to NPs at the same time as to national governments. Nevertheless, NPs still do not enjoy 
automatic access to several types of documents. As a result, the obligation to send documents to NPs 
could in the future be extended to cover basically all documents used in making decisions in EU 
institutions, including documents on Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and those 
prepared by member states for the European Council.  
Also the decision for the Council to meet in public when acting as a legislative body is a step 
forward, allowing both parliamentarians and the citizens at large to witness what ministers do in 
Brussels. The logical extension of the new constitutional provisions would be that in the future 
Council would also process non-legislative items in public. In order to give NPs sufficient time to 
deal with issues, the Council should also make its work more systematic, with no urgency 
procedures or other short-track options.(31) Better organisation would increase the legitimacy of the 
Council and provide reassurance to the voters about how the EU institutions work and how their 
ministers carry out their duties.(32) 
Secondly, the ‘early warning system’ established for monitoring compliance with the subsidiarity 
principle will increase the involvement of NPs in the EU’s policy process. It can also have a spill-
over effect, with national legislators from now on paying more attention to EU matters in general. 
However, this mechanism was mainly introduced in response to legitimacy concerns, and it is very 
likely that its impact will remain modest. Indeed, if the NPs aim to make efficient use of the ‘early 
warning system’, they will need to invest substantially more time and resources to processing EU 
matters.(33)  
The extended use of OMC and other forms of intergovernmental policy coordination at least partially 
cancel out the positive constitutional developments. The leaders of the EU need to attain desired 
policy objectives, such as employment, economic growth, and indeed combating terrorism, but they 
(and also the public) are reluctant to transfer formal decision-making authority in such matters to the 
European level. Hence the national governments have increasingly resorted to various types of soft 
law instruments for achieving their goals. But, here the EU is facing a trade-off between output and 
input legitimacy. In cooperative or executive federalism, civil servants and ministers are responsible 
for coordinating national policies. However, the decision process is removed from the public sphere 
to intergovernmental meetings taking place behind closed doors. As a result, cooperative federalism 
weakens the transparency of collective decision-making and, consequently, the accountability of the 
representatives. Cooperative federalism by design thus emphasises output legitimacy at the expense 
of transparency and parliamentary accountability.  
To facilitate parliamentary involvement in OMC and other non-binding forms of intergovernmental 
coordination, such ‘soft law’ matters should be processed by NPs using the same procedure that is 
reserved for scrutinizing the Commission’s legislative initiatives. This would mean that ministers 
would be forced to explain their actions before parliamentary committees and in the plenary (where 
such a requirement exists), with MPs having the chance to put questions to the ministers or other 
government representatives travelling to Brussels (de Búrca and Zeitlin 2003; Jacobsson and Schmid 
2003). While MPs and parliamentary civil servants may object to this by saying that their desks are 
already full without having to process such non-binding matters, one must keep in mind that policy 
coordination is to an increasing extent used in questions that are highly salient for most MPs – such 
as employment policy, economic policy, social policy, and pension reforms. Efficient scrutiny of 
such matters is thus significant also in terms of national legislation, as the policy choices adopted at 
the European level increasingly impact on and constrain member states’ domestic politics. Hence 
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Much of the intergovernmental coordination in the EU is carried out at the very highest political 
level in the European Council, particularly so in foreign policy and in fixing the EU’s long-term 
priorities in economic policy. The ‘conclusions’ of the European Council have increased rapidly in 
length and encompass basically all conceivable policy sectors.(35) Also the Constitutional Treaty 
will arguably strengthen the role of the European Council. This may not appear problematic for the 
NPs. After all, in most issues the European Council still decides by unanimity, and hence NPs can, at 
least in theory, veto any proposals they do not like. However, in reality the situation is more 
complicated. In order for NPs to exercise meaningful ex ante control on their governments in the 
European Council, the agendas of the Summits would have to be available well before the European 
Council convenes, and the agendas should not be changed after they have been published.(36) Until 
now the agendas of the European Council have often been finalized far too late and have even 
changed during the course of the meetings. Particularly in such situations NPs may not want to ex 
post veto the decisions of the European Council, especially as this might jeopardize the future 
influence of the country in EU negotiations, and because this could embarrass the national 
government, both in the European context and in national media. Hence effective parliamentary 
scrutiny of the Summits requires that the European Council works on the basis of fixed agendas that 
are published well in advance of the meetings.(37)  
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Endnotes  
(*) Earlier versions of the article were presented at the conferences ‘National Parliaments and the 
European Union: Issues of Oversight and Scrutiny’, University of Limerick, 21-22 May 2004, and 
‘Towards A European Constitution: from the Convention to the IGC and Beyond’, Goodenough 
College, London, 1-2 July 2004. I am extremely grateful to Christina Bengtson, Adam Cygan, 
Francesco Duina, Hans Hegeland, Fredrik Langdal, and Peter Saramo for their help and comments 
and to Kerstin Jacobsson and Juho Saari for information on OMC.  
(**) At the time of writing this article (June 2004), the fate of the Treaty remains unclear. All 
references to the Treaty here are to the ‘final’ version (Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe) 
published in the Official Journal of the European Union 2004/C 310/01.  
(1) Measuring the powers of parliaments is an inherently difficult task, and hence such arguments 
about ‘the decline of parliaments’ need to be treated with necessary caution.  
(2) This was not surprising, given that out of the 105 members of the Convention, 56 represented 
NPs, 28 national governments, and 16 the European Parliament.  
(3) Treaty of Nice, Official Journal C 80, 10 March 2001.  
(4) Laeken Declaration – The Future of the European Union, The Laeken European Council, 14-15 
December 2001.  
(5) The WG was convened on 26 June 2002 and it submitted its report on 22 October 2002. The WG 
was chaired by the British Labour MP, Gisela Stuart, and it held nine meetings. For detailed 
information on the WG and plenary debates on the role of NPs, as well as on the activities of 
national parliamentarians in the Convention, see Brown (2003) and Rizzuto (2003).  
(6) COSAC meets once every six months in the member state holding the Council Presidency, 
bringing together delegations from the national parliaments’ European Affairs Committees and from 
the EP. Its decisions are normally taken by consensus and they are not binding on NPs or on EU 
institutions. However, in recent years COSAC has been reforming its organisation and decision-
making. COSAC adopted its new rules of procedure in Athens in May 2003, and these allow for 
contributions to be passed with 3/4 of votes cast (which must also constitute at last half of all votes). 
As of 2004, COSAC also has a Secretariat in Brussels. 
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exception was the idea of “a European week”. According to the WG IV’s final report, “A European 
week should be organised each year to create a common window for EU-wide debates on European 
issues in every Member State.” (European Convention 2002a: 15) 
(8) For information on research services in European legislatures, see Robinson (2002).  
(9) Having too much information is – at least in some member states – part of the problem, as MPs 
often find it very difficult to identify the important points from the mass of documents they receive. 
In addition, NPs should receive information that enables them to understand the consequences of the 
initiatives, particularly concerning their linkage with other policy questions and their long-term 
effects at both national and European levels. While NPs do receive such information both from the 
Commission (in the text of the initiatives; particularly since 2003) and in the majority of the member 
states from their government (usually in the form of a memoranda or a summary accompanying the 
legislative proposal), national MPs do often find it difficult to grasp the broader implications of the 
legislation they are scrutinizing.  
9a It should be emphasized, however, that these non-legislative documents are already easily 
available, for example from the Commission's website. 
(10) “The Council shall meet in public when it deliberates and votes on a draft legislative act. To this 
end, each Council meeting shall be divided into two parts, dealing respectively with deliberations on 
Union legislative acts and non-legislative activities.” 
(11) There was also a small change concerning decision-making in the Council. The Protocol 
attached to the Amsterdam Treaty had stated that six weeks shall elapse between a legislative 
proposal being made available in all languages to the EP and the Council and the date when it is 
placed on a Council agenda for decision (subject to exceptions on grounds of urgency). The new 
Protocol reads: ” A six-week period shall elapse between a draft European legislative act being made 
available to national Parliaments in the official languages of the Union and the date when it is placed 
on a provisional agenda for the Council for its adoption or for adoption of a position under a 
legislative procedure. Exceptions shall be possible in cases of urgency, the reasons for which shall be 
stated in the act or position of the Council. Save in urgent cases for which due reasons have been 
given, no agreement may be reached on a draft European legislative act during those six weeks. Save 
in urgent cases for which due reasons have been given, a ten-day period shall elapse between the 
placing of a draft European legislative act on the provisional agenda for the Council and the adoption 
of a position. ” 
(12) The WG on national parliaments had recommended in its final report that “Council should 
legislate with open doors. Policy coordination as well as other activities should also be carried out 
with open doors as much as possible.” (European Convention 2002a: 3-4). 
(13) When addressing the French National Assembly on 3 February 1994, the Foreign Minister 
Alain Juppé had expressed his hope that NPs would be empowered to challenge EU laws on the 
grounds that they violated the subsidiarity principle. (Rittberger 2004: 26) While many of the 
proposals calling for a chamber of national MPs had argued that such a body should have a role in 
monitoring the compliance of EU legislation with subsidiarity, the kind of mechanism that emerged 
during the Convention was by and large a novelty.  
(14) In the Protocol on Subsidiarity included in the Amsterdam Treaty, the Commission was obliged 
to carry out wide internal and external consultations before publishing a legislative proposal, to 
justify each initiative in the preambles of its documents, and to ensure that financial and 
administrative impacts of the initiatives are kept to a minimum. 
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principle after the six weeks have elapsed. Thus NPs can not act if the Council or the EP or the 
Conciliation Committee subsequently amends the initiative in such a way as to raise concerns about 
it violating the subsidiarity principle. However, it is probable that this will not constitute a serious 
problem.  
(16) An amendment discussed in the Convention proposed a collective right of veto to NPs: if 2/3 of 
parliaments rejected a proposal on the grounds of subsidiarity principle (‘the red card’), then the 
Commission would have been forced to withdraw it (Langdal 2003: 27). 
(17) Moreover, according to the Protocol the Commission is only required to give ‘reasons’ for its 
decision. A more stringent wording – for example, with the Commission required to give detailed 
reasons for its decision – would have provided a stronger incentive for the Commission not to abuse 
its powers.  
(18) ECJ has at least once ruled in such a case: the German government commenced an action on 
behalf of the Bundestag which believed that the EU did not have the competence to introduce the 
Tobacco Advertising Directive (Case C-376/98 Germany v. European Parliament and Council 
(Tobacco Advertising Directive) [2000] ECR I-8419). I am grateful to Adam Cygan for pointing this 
out to me and for providing me information on the other legal aspects of the ‘early warning system’. 
(19) There appears to be broad consensus, also among national parliamentarians, that the 
overwhelming majority of Commission’s legislative proposals are not problematic in terms of the 
subsidiarity principle.  
(20) This was also the main problem with the proposal (that was discussed in the Convention) of 
including representatives of NPs in national delegations when the Council acts in legislative capacity 
(Rizzuto 2003: 2).  
(21) However, it is the Commission that publishes the initiative. Hence there is also the possibility 
that if the government does not agree with the actual policy contents of the initiative, and finds itself 
on the losing side in the Council, it will ask the parliament to contest the initiative on the grounds of 
subsidiarity.  
(22) However, on the other hand the new member states have just completed the implementation of 
the acquis communautaire. Hence they have strong recent administrative and political experiences of 
dealing with EU legislation, and this might make them rather well-equipped to use the ‘early 
warning system’.  
(23) The Conference of the Speakers of EU Parliaments established in its annual meeting in Athens 
in May 2003 a working group (“The Athens Group”) on how to strengthen interparliamentary 
cooperation. Another working group operating under the leadership of the Swedish parliament, IPEX 
(Interparliamentary EU Information Exchange), was set up to provide a platform for the electronic 
exchange of EU-related information between NPs, including information concerning monitoring 
subsidiarity.  
(24) An alternative mechanism that has been suggested would bring NPs together once a year to 
comment on the Commission's annual legislative programme, and to decide (perhaps by QMV) 
which initiatives should be discarded (Maurer 2002a,b). However, this would confuse the lines of 
accountability at the European level as the Commission is accountable to the EP, not to the national 
legislatures.  
(25) Article 11 (3) of the Constitutional Treaty states that “Under the principle of subsidiarity, in 
areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Union shall act only if and insofar as the 
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central level or at regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the 
proposed action, be better achieved at Union level.” 
(26) The role of committees, or ‘committee governance’, has recently received increased attention in 
EU studies. Much of this work, owing a debt to the writings of Habermas, argues that governance by 
committees represents “deliberative supranationalism” or “democratic experimentalism”, with a 
common will emerging through a process of deliberation where new perspectives may be taken on 
board and preferences are altered. However, there is a trade-off between efficiency and democracy, 
as committees meet behind closed doors, with low transparency and debates insulated from the 
public sphere, and decision-making is limited to a narrow group of civil servants. Regardless of how 
one perceives the role of committees, they do indeed have a lot of influence at the European level, as 
their outputs are almost identical with eventual Council decisions.  
(27) See in particular the material available at the homepage of the OMC Forum at the European 
Union Center of the University of Wisconsin-Madison (http://eucenter.wisc.edu/OMC) and the 
literature mentioned in Borrás and Greve eds. (2004).  
(28) The role of the Commission in OMC and other forms of policy coordination varies considerably 
between policy areas, with the Council often adopting the leading function instead of the 
Commission.  
(29) However, in addition to the central role of the Commission and/or the Council, in several 
instances the non-binding policy recommendations are adopted by QMV instead of unanimity.  
(30) Another related and highly important question, which lies beyond the scope of this article, is the 
extent to which these civil servants are subject to control by their ministers or even by their 
immediate superiors in the ministries.  
(31) See, for example House of Commons (2002).  
(32) See House of Lords (2001).  
(33) Effective monitoring of the subsidiarity principle also necessitates organisational adaptation 
within NPs. In addition to the legislatures probably needing more secretarial staff for analysing the 
contents of the Commission’s proposals and for producing information independent of the 
government, the parliaments will also have to take decisions on the division of labour. Shall 
monitoring subsidiarity be delegated downwards to specialized committees or will it be centralized 
to the committee responsible for EU matters? (Langdal 2003: 42; Maurer and Kietz 2004: 6-7) 
Information on the organisational solutions adopted by the national parliaments is available at 
COSAC’s website (http://www.cosac.org/en/info/earlywarning/).  
(34) This way national legislators would also have the possibility to learn about developments and 
policy choices in other countries, hence making it possible for national parliaments to produce better 
laws in the future (Duina and Oliver 2005). After all, this is a key argument used in favour of OMC.  
(35) However, it must be emphasized that the Summits are preceded by lengthy negotiations 
between sectoral ministers and civil servants from the member states. The European Council 
therefore actually ‘decides’ (or debates) only a minor share of the issues listed in its conclusions.  
(36) The obvious exceptions could be major events, such as terrorist attacks or natural disasters that 
occur after the agendas have been published and require action from the European Council.  
(37) The current system of the rotating Council Presidency has made the situation even worse by 
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Presidencies tend to produce a peak of activity towards the end of each six-month period (in June 
and in December) as there is a pressure to reach agreement before handing the Presidency over to 
another member state. A further problem is that, particularly in June, the European Council convenes 
at a time when parliaments in some countries are not in session.  
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